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Labour and the Culture Wars of Modern Politics – Jon Lawrence 
Abstract 
Any attempt to understand and reverse the major defeat suffered by Labour in 
December 2019 needs first to appreciate why comparisons with the defeats of 
the 1980s are so unhelpful. Whereas in 1983 Labour was all but wiped out 
across southern England, it held on comfortably across the ‘red wall’. In 2019 
Labour did well in cities and university towns across the south, and appears to 
have solved its historic problem with the southern, educated middle class. 
However this has been at the expense of alienating working-class voters across 
the country, not just in its former industrial heartlands. But this is not 
inevitable. A reanalysis of testimony from hundreds of interviews with working 
people across England from the 1940s onwards allows insights into attitudes 
and values that are often obscured by survey techniques. Crucially, it points to 
a broad-based vernacular liberalism at odds with the culture wars model of a 
terminal crisis for social democracy.  




Since publishing Me, Me Me? The Search for Community in Post-war England 
last summer I have mainly found myself embroiled in debates about the 
recurring tension between self and society in recent decades, and its implication 
for the future of ‘community’.1 The book re-analyses the original testimony 
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collected by social-science studies conducted between the 1940s and the late 
2000s and challenges simplistic accounts of the triumph of individualism, and 
the decline of the community. It argues that people have consistently sought 
ways to reconcile social connection and personal autonomy in their lives, and 
that in many ways people are better able to sustain meaningful social 
relationships in the twenty-first century than they were during the supposed 
golden age of urban ‘community’. We should therefore be wary, not just of 
exaggerated accounts of the social anomie of post-industrial society, but also of 
accounts which insist on the emergence of a new cleavage between the 
connected and the rootless – or in David Goodhart’s evocative phrase: between 
the ‘somewheres’ and the ‘anywheres’.2  
The relevance of these issues for the Labour party is evident, but I was 
nonetheless brought up short during the recent election when an eminent 
historian insisted that I had really written a book about the crisis currently 
facing the Labour Party. I was adamant that this was the book I had chosen not 
to write, but nonetheless I knew he had a point. Although the book is primarily 
focused on reconstructing popular conceptions of social change, in the process it 
necessarily challenges models of working-class life and politics, both idealised 
and demonised, that still have significant influence on the left.  
The size and nature of Labour’s latest electoral disaster has unsurprisingly 
encouraged me to think harder about how the evidence documented in Me, Me, 
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Me? could be used to reflect on the challenges now facing Labour politics. But 
before exploring what lessons might be learned from thousands of pages of 
contemporary personal testimony that informs Me, Me, Me?, it is helpful to 
explore some of the ways in which the 2019 election is different from Michael 
Foot’s historic drubbing in 1983 (the election most often summoned up when 
media pundits sought to find an instant parallel for Corbyn’s dramatic defeat). 
The most obvious difference is that in 1983 Labour was all but wiped out across 
southern England; holding on only in its working-class London heartlands and 
in three scattered working-class enclaves: Thurrock, Ipswich and Bristol South. 
In 2019 it swept the board in Bristol, holding all four seats easily, and did well 
in cities and university towns across the south, even holding Canterbury, which 
before the surprise result in 2017 had never been Labour. But in a sense this is 
the party’s problem – it has solved its historic problem with the southern, 
educated middle class at the expense of alienating its former industrial 
heartlands of the Midlands, the north and, let’s not forget, central Scotland. In 
the 1980s, when the appeal of the SDP/Liberal Alliance was sapping Labour’s 
strength across southern England, it would have been literally unimaginable that 
mining seats like Dennis Skinner’s Bolsover or Tony Blair’s Sedgefield might 
fall to the Tories. In 1983 the party had majorities of 13,848 and 8,281 
respectively in these two seats. It would have been equally absurd to suggest 
that Stoke-on-Trent might return three Conservative MPs with large majorities. 
Labour’s world has literally been turned upside down since the early 1990s 
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when North Durham MP Giles Radice penned his famous series of pamphlets 
outlining how Labour might go about solving its ‘Southern Discomfort’.3  
The question is, was this inevitable? The Brexit issue certainly made Labour’s 
task exceptionally difficult, especially given the leadership’s serial dithering on 
the issue, which undoubtedly weakened its credibility with unaligned voters. 
But Labour’s problems with its traditional, working-class heartlands in the 
north, the Midlands and central Scotland predate Brexit. Nor can Labour afford 
to focus only on the  post-industrial regions – it did equally poorly in many of 
the southern, socially mixed urban seats that polled heavily for Labour in the 
Blair years and which it will need to regain to form a majority government 
(especially as a radical redrawing of constituency boundaries is overdue and 
will further harm Labour).  It is striking that Labour held Canterbury whilst 
losing badly in the band of industrial seats that run along the north Kent coast, 
just as it won leafy Bristol West but remained a distant second in the city’s 
more working-class, suburban hinterland of Kingswood, where I grew up, or 
nearby Filton & Bradley Stoke. Seats such as Swindon, Milton Keynes, 
Stevenage, Watford, and Basildon all tell the same story, as do Thurrock and 
Ipswich, despite having weathered the Thatcherite storm in 1983. In short, 
Labour needs to rediscover how to connect with working-class voters across 
Britain, not just in the north and Midlands.  
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Pundits tell us that Labour’s problems are insuperable; that it’s caught in the 
middle of a new culture war between a mobile, educated, predominantly young 
and liberal middle class, and a largely immobile, poorly educated, older and more 
socially conservative working and lower middle class.4  Under Jeremy Corbyn 
the party tried to triangulate this problem by combining social liberalism with a 
strongly radical, redistributive economic programme aimed at least in part at 
shoring up its post-industrial, working-lass base. Even in 2017, when Labour 
enjoyed an unexpectedly large uplift in the popular vote from 30 to 40 per cent, 
it still lost a series of historic working-class seats scattered across the so-called 
‘red wall’ including Mansfield, Walsall North, Stoke-on-Trent South, Derbyshire 
North-East and Copeland in Cumbria and saw its vote fall in many others. Even 
without the powers of hindsight it was obvious that the omens were profoundly 
shaky for this type of top-down triangulation of Labour’s offer.5  
But, as I argue in Me, Me, Me?, all is not lost for Labour. The ‘culture wars’ 
between its different social constituencies are not as deep-seated and insuperable 
as many suppose.  Labour’s working-class supporters (and former supporters) 
may, on average, offer less liberal responses to pollsters’ trigger questions on 
crime, LGBT rights or immigration than the party’s middle-class supporters, but 
it does not follow that they are instinctively illiberal in their world view. Such 
attitudinal differences spring largely from people’s different life situations and 
experiences, and should not automatically be assumed to represent fixed badges 
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of identity, let alone the key determinants of political allegiance. Hence the rapid 
shifts in popular attitudes to sexuality and racial difference that have occurred 
over the past half century as people’s experiences and social understanding have 
changed.6   
By tracing popular attitudes over the long-term, Me, Me, Me? highlights the 
strong hold of a quiet, non-assertive liberalism over English popular culture; a 
liberalism rooted in long-established popular ideas about ‘fair play’, ‘live and let 
live’, and the right to privacy and personal autonomy. The problem is that this 
common sense popular liberalism can often jar with the sensibilities of 
metropolitan liberalism, immersed as it is in the carefully crafted ‘correct’ 
language for discussing issues such as transgender rights, unconscious racism, or 
post-colonialism. Arguably it is here that political attitudes as fixed badges of 
identity loom largest, and Labour needs to find a way to uphold these expanded 
conceptions of individual liberty without appearing to judge or dismiss voters 
who are unfamiliar or even uninterested in such issues. Here the strong purchase 
of ideas about personal autonomy and freedom in the vernacular is Labour’s great 
ally – but it needs to display confidence in a liberal-minded, tolerant populace to 
make this version of triangulation work. 
As Me, Me, Me? argues, the myths we live by matter, and for its own sake Labour 
therefore needs to believe in and champion a vision of the general public as 
decent, progressive, and reform-minded.  It helps that there is plenty of evidence 
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to back up such a reading, but the point about myths is that they represent 
powerful tools for understanding and hence defining the social world.7 It is a real 
problem, therefore, that we so often find the left perpetuating derogatory, 
judgmental myths about small town and suburban Britain. Arguments about ‘left 
behind’ Britons or the ‘white working class’ perpetuate unhelpful myths which 
simultaneously flatten the complexity of lives lived and give succour to voices 
from the radical right.8 
But in addition to developing a more subtle sociology of politics, Labour also 
needs to break with its current top-down, paternalistic political style, which seems 
to rely on attracting voters with extravagant, barely credible policy offers, rather 
than taking the time to engage directly with those voters’ pressing hopes and 
fears. As John Harris has recently argued, the party needs to connect with the tens 
of thousands of community activists working to build radical social change on 
the ground.9 It also needs to develop the direct, idiomatic political language that 
can help to unite the common sense liberalism to be found in its former post-
industrial heartlands with the identity politics of its new metropolitan heartlands. 
This will not be an easy task, and can only be achieved through a significant 
injection of professionalism at the heart of the party machine. No one wants the 
return of the unalloyed politics of spin, but unless Labour again becomes capable 
of honing sharp, apposite political messages based on a sophisticated 
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understanding of popular attitudes it will have no chance of reconstructing a 




Special thanks, as ever, to Jane Elliott.  
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